In Part V we consider whether a well-ordered democratic society is possible, and if so, how its possibility is consistent with human nature and the requirements of workable political institutions. We try to show that the well-ordered society of justice as fairness is indeed possible according to our nature and those requirements.
This endeavor belongs to political philosophy as reconciliation; for seeing that the conditions of a social world at least allow for that possibility affects our view of the world itself and our attitude toward it. No longer need it seem hopelessly hostile, a world in which the will to dominate and oppressive cruelties, abetted by prejudice and folly, must inevitably prevail. None of this may ease our loss, situated as we may be in a corrupt society. But we may reflect that the world is not in itself inhospitable to political justice and its good. Our social world might have been different and there is hope for those at another time and place.
(Justice as Fairness, p. 38)
7 comments:
I learned last semester that before being inducted into the realm of philosophy rock stardom, Rawls had distinguished himself as an outstanding baseball player likely headed for a professional career. I bet he threw a mean curve-ball! I'll have to respond with some thoughts on human nature and biopolitics when I get a breather this week from studying Rawls' philosophical buddies.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nhizo7KrZrw&eurl=
this might get at most of it
This is far from inspiring, to say the least. Perhaps “political philosophy”, in the well-ordered democratic society of institutions (i.e., the state, the university, the hospital, etc.), is reconciliation. But since when did politics itself, in its concrete practice, and not in the regressive hopes of utopian and liberal cynical idealism today, which seeks to regressively divorce itself from practice, have anything to do with reconciliation? Is the goal of politics simply to reach an end to itself, to make a series of compromises, to turn one’s back on the conditions for thinking determined by the concrete situation? Is this not what the sophist-representatives of the people - the makers of the opinion polls and the citizen-debaters themselves - really want: an end to politics as such? A war to end all wars? No, an agreement of particular wills is not an agreement of the generic will. Look at most, not all, agreements between states with sort of particular interest. Do these end the violence of particular interests in the world, in the name of order and justice? Far from it.
Politics is not a series of compromises; it is the appearance in the world of fundamentally irresolvable disagreements; that it is to say, it is a presentation – not a representation – of a wrong, undermining the ideals of the static thinking of rights, for, precisely, those who have no rights. Does anything change if we simply assume “political philosophy” to seek an end in some sort of ideal understanding or agreement? In other words, does “political philosophy” not by seeking utopian dreams in some future of understanding, where we all get along and live in peace, happily pursuing our egotistic fantasies without any contradiction, immediately foreclose the possibility of politics as such?
Political philosophy? No, politics and philosophy are not the same thing…(to continue…)
"But we may reflect that the world is not in itself inhospitable to political justice and its good. Our social world might have been different and there is hope for those at another time and place."
Whereas, albeit, politics is an inevitably flawed and corrupt exchange of compromise and coercion with a pluralist mass : one at some point can [and perhaps should] attempt to view the world they are presented in, make a value judgement upon the 'injustices' perceived (keeping in mind the bias and flaws of an individual's subjective perspective), and choose to act in the face of potential flaw or failure.
This is not an argument for static political manifestation in the form of changeless coercive institutions; but rather an argument to risk a judgement, and then participation in the forever ongoing political arena or 'event.' In other words, to see what is wrong in the world and attempt to fight injustice.
I see what Rawls is saying, whether you agree with it or not, as inspiring simply in his fundamental idea of the arbitrariness of our current poltical position and our individual position (with a complete lack of deservedness.) It could have been different (is this a Kant-ish argument?) and thus it can be different.
I think Rawls is attempting to codify justice in the aim of seriously helping the exploited (which is dangerous to define). I also think that one could reconcile Rawls with a type of Marxism (more class analysis than historical materialism).
At the end of the day, I think political philosophy, as abstracting and unrealistic as it may seem, should be at its core a source of inspiration and guidance (in the construction of an ongoing debate and dialogue) for action. In this I think Rawls is important and succeeds in provoking the type of thought that leads to political action.
I cannot agree more though that political philosophy should never be a codified static medium, (where is perhaps a problem with Rawls' inevitable structural prescription), as this leads to power grabs and corruption (even in the name of righteousness, ie historical examples of 'failed' Marxist or socialist revolutions) that ruin the whole 'utopian' project.
For me its always about the struggle in the face of absurdity. I have to agree, there is to be no reconciliation.
Some quick comments, that I will continue in later posts.
"to...make a value judgement upon the 'injustices' perceived"
Here is one symptom of "political philosophy": it reduces politics to morality.
"an argument to risk a judgement, and then participation in the forever ongoing political arena or 'event.' In other words, to see what is wrong in the world and attempt to fight injustice."
Risk, yes. Philosophy (and it’s desire) requires us to throw the dice, to be thoughtful gamblers, if you will. Judgment, no. See above. I don't think that a risk is a judgment, but a taking a chance on something in which one does not know of the outcome, nor can decide the outcome from the start (which would imply a judgment on the outcome?) for while there may be a finite set of possibilities as to what numbers may appear when the dice come to rest, if the die is cast so as to include an infinite set of possible outcomes, there is also an infinite set of consequences to each throw. It is therefore necessary to assess those consequences, not prior to throwing, but, rather, in the process of there rolling, but knowing fully well what the stakes of the original risk involved.
First, I certainly agree that defining "the exploited" is dangerous. But perhaps we should do away with defining the exploited. It seems much more important that we focus on the processes whereby emancipation takes place.
Second, who said we have to define everything? I well admit, that I all to easily fell to the temptation to demand definitions from Russell, when I know, in fact, that Russell, the man, is dead, and definitions won't be provided to me, even if I read his complete oeuvre (even if the inscription of his thought is immortal). And, furthermore, does not the concept of a definition imply an end to thinking of the terms, once those terms are defined?
Temptation: to name Rawls', liberal, evolutionary, naturalist, and humanist thinking, in general, rather than static, but, borrowing a term from the pre-Platonics, a taken up contemporarily by the philosopher of science, Michel Serres, homeorrhetic, or having the physical properties of, seemingly paradoxical, stable flow (analytic philosophy would probably name such a term non-sense). But I will avoid this temptation as I do not wish to so easily conflate physics with politics, biology, ecology, and anthropology. Serres, whose postmodern philosophy, employs a poetic style of near impenetrability (perhaps, an obscurantism/sophistry/hermeneutics), comparable to Derrida and Heidegger. I would say he is close to Heidegger in his obsessional neurosis over what constitutes the "origins" of things (for example, in Heidegger: language - i.e., Greek logos, and then German, and then we know very what; and, in Serres: physics, Lucretius' clinamen, and...).
"one could reconcile Rawls with a type of Marxism"
Agreed, barring that Marxism is not hastily equated with Marx's philosophy. (I will post on this soon.)
"At the end of the day, I think political philosophy, as abstracting and unrealistic as it may seem, should be at its core a source of inspiration and guidance (in the construction of an ongoing debate and dialogue) for action. In this I think Rawls is important and succeeds in provoking the type of thought that leads to political action."
I completely disagree with this position, but, nevertheless, I think you've hit "political philosophy" right on the dot. To be continued...
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