The first paragraph of the essay-
"Words have two functions: on the one hand to state facts, and on the other to evoke emotions. The latter is their older function, and is performed among animals by cries which antedate language. One of the most important elements in the transition from barbarism to civilization is the increasing use of words to indicate rather than to excite, but in politics little has been done in this direction. If I say the area of Hungary is so many square kilometers, I am making a purely informative statement, but when I say that the area of the U.S.S.R. is one sixth of the land surface of the globe, my statement is mainly emotional."
For additional paragraphs please consult the various Russell volumes floating around this friend group for the essay entitled: "A Plea for Clear Thinking."
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Some questions and other statements of fact and evocations of emotion for Bertrand, et al.:
What separates or determines an emotional evocation from a mere statement of well-known (or not) fact? For, on second glance, one could very well clearly think that the two given examples are simply statements of facts. But what is a fact? Something that is true, has value, is meaningful, is empirically given, is positively determined, is as is, is logically complete, closed, consistent...? Secondly, if Russell's plea for clear thinking seeks to do away with the use of "emotional" evocations, since the question is a question of fact, what exactly are periods that Russell is referring to when he evokes the transition from barbarism to civilization? Or rather what thinkers is he in fact referring to? Who are the barbarists, in fact, if you will? What is civilization in fact?
A: the area of Russia is one sixth of the land surface of the globe, (or, in other words, the area of Russia is 17,075,400 square kilometers). Question: am I making these set of words informative by adding other words which are informative? Can a set of words, be simultaneously emotive and informative: an evocative statement, an informative emotion, etc.? Does the inclusion of an informative statement with an emotive evocation negate its emotive element(s)? B: the area of Hungary is 93,030 square kilometers. What makes the A emotional and B informative? Is it the fact that Russia is roughly 183 times largely in area than Hungary, or is 14 times larger in population than Hungary?
How terribly limited are these spaces in comparison to the observable material space of the universe (stretching across billions of light-years)! And what of that which is not observable, positively definable, this "dark matter", "dark energy", etc.? What would Russell make of these? Should we then give up the on the possibility that these certain things, which are not (yet) things, which are objects without any discernible content, which are not describable may exist in the future, even if they are undefinable and/or without meaning now? In other words, what of the facts, which are not yet facts?
Let us make the thinking of things clear: the thinking of the universe of things is not clear. Perhaps, I am a barbarist? So be it, for often, in fact, I see little positive difference between the the acts of barbarism and the acts of the civilizer (see the encyclopedia of informative facts on colonialism, imperialism, etc.). Then when you reach the limits of the finitude of facts, we'll see how clear thinking can be.
Remember that an inevitable outgrowth of logical positivism was a form of nihilism called emotivism. The emotivists (Ayer and Stevenson were probably the most notable) held that all moral/ethical statements were literally/essentially meaningless. That is because, for example, the statements “it’s good to keep your promises” or “you shouldn’t lie to your lover” don’t indicate anything which could be empirically verified: thus, they have no truth values (are neither true nor false). They end up getting classified as emotive (mere expressions of emotion) and are translated: “hurray for telling the truth!” and “boo! and hiss! to lying to your lover.” This also entails that there is no way to arbitrate ethical disputes and so pursuing them is seen to be a waste of our time. I think when this consequence of the theory is made apparent some of its intuitive appeal can be tempered.
I think the nihilism here comes from a general and very Modern hostility to the passions (or more strongly, to the nature of the human will). But also, there’s the remaining issue of whether it is at all possible to fully divorce our reason from our emotions/passions as they function in a social setting (ought implies can). I would argue that even in our most ardent attempts to do so our discourses still reflect interests which are not purely rational or concerned solely with facts.
I think we have good reason to believe that we can’t transcend linguistic condition in the way that Russell might like. This is evident in Russell’s very advice that we should. The logical positivists have notoriously fallen prey to the criticism that in asserting that “we should stick to statements that are ‘relations of ideas’ or ‘matters of fact’!” they are base their philosophy on a statement which is neither. I think you find the spirit of this embarrassing criticism in this excerpt.
I suppose I agree with the critique of Russel's scenario but I'd need to see the larger picture and context.
Is he just saying that we should try to avoid emotional judgement and bias in our writing if we are trying to convey a journalistic representation of an event or idea?
Is he arguing for a distinction or intentional separation between an emotional and value-laden argument, and a dry fact-based assumption?
(this of course putting aside the problematic nature of "truth," so we can even begin to approach a statement, albeit philosophically pragmatic, instead of the endless deferment of deconstruction)
First of all let's bring this paragraph into context.
Russell wrote this essay near the end of World War II and is obviously commenting on political rhetoric emerging around the conflict between the U.S.S.R and the United States. This paragraph concerns the Cold War.
Let's next take a look at what this essay is not.
It is not an epistemological argument. Russell is not seeking to define a 'fact' or what constitutes a 'truth statement'. (However, to see what he says on such matters please consult "Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits," by Bertrand Russell.) Furthermore, these sentences are not a critique of other philosophical schools or ways of defining "truth." Notice that the 'truth' of the statement "the area of the U.S.S.R. is one sixth of the land surface of the globe," is nowhere questioned. This paragraph is also not a call for a mission civilisatrice. I find it curious how one of the above arguments implicitly labels those exploited in "colonialism" and "imperialism" as "Barbarians," when Russell does no such thing. Finally, nowhere does Russell argue that we can "transcend [humans'] linguistic condition." Rather, he is pointing out a difference in how language is sometimes used.
What is this paragraph?
The statement "the area of the U.S.S.R. is one sixth of the land surface of the globe," divides the world into segments in which "land surface" (controlled territory and natural resources) is something to compete for. It suggests not only competition but fear of control over the whole. Russell is asking individuals to be conscious and careful of how seemingly innocuous facts are used (remember, he is not discussing what a fact is) in political rhetoric to subvert reason through an appeal to emotion. There is no need to bring in such concepts as "dark energy" and "dark matter," this is distracting and has nothing to do with the point Russell is making.
Why do I find this interesting?
Because I believe political rhetoric is currently filled with words and phrases which seek to excite rather than truly inform. Examples come so easily, I feel a sincere sense of shame that I am not doing more to actively point it out. "We don't want the smoking gun to come in the form of a mushroom cloud," or "Operation Iraqi Freedom," or "No-Child Left Behind" or "the Death Tax." But not only in politics; take a look at Joey Cienian's current stick of deodorant which is labeled/advertised with the following words, "Power...Ultra...Stronger...Flavor...Solid...X-treme (sic)..." "Wow! I'm so fucking x-cited to use this deodorant !"
I've gotta agree that when it comes to political rhetoric these days its impossible to come across anything that seems genuinely informative. Sadly, I always find myself enchanted with presidential candidates who offer us some odd form of fact in the debates, regardless of whether I align with them ideologically. good information is just that hard to come by. Nevertheless, I am wary of the suggestion that we need to stick to the facts and get over the emotive nonsense. Mostly, it's because I think that its impossible - and suggesting it as a new progressive way might prevent us from finding it in all it's forms: lowly demagoguery to ivory tower speak. Has Russell escaped the emotive influence in language? I think by using civilization and barbarism in the ways he does, it becomes clear that he hasn't. But why should he? Like I say, I'm fed up with the sorry state of political discourse myself.
By the way, I'm enjoying the participation/interaction on the blags lately. It's good to have friends who keep you on your toes and writing.
I don't think Russell's use of "civilization" and "barbarism" reflect his inability to make "a plea for clear thinking", but more likely our inability to interpret these terms beyond what red flags they raise. "Barbarism" especially makes us roll our eyes...oh come on, Joseph Conrad!
But I don't think Russell is using these terms within the context of colonialism, but rather to express our linguistic transcendence from humans as animals to humans as the great communicators. At some point, we must admit, humans have gone from social groups to societies, and it's a shared history by every living person today.
I also think that his dichotomy, while an intriguing literary device (and especially well-placed in the opening paragraph), has its obvious limitations. Of course statements can be both emotive and factual; any comment along the lines of "I am hungry" falls on both sides of the divide.
Initially, I thought Russell's two sides would be better classified as "statements that can be verified by others" (the factual) and "statements that can only be verified by the individual" (the emotive), but this isn't where Russell wants to go with it, and it is evident in his examples. Both are factual statements, but the second conveys a competitive nature that would become inherent in the Cold War. Two facts, but one is highly emotive.
So even when John McCain "shoots straight," it's a fair question to ask what he's shooting.
You make a lot of great points here. I'll have to take some time with them. But to start with, I don't think Russell is necessarily speaking within an imperialist context. However, imperialism was conceived and justified on the foundation of Enlightenment thought. Many great thinkers were unwittingly used to justify colonialism. Specifically those who praised the social and intellectual developments of Europe as representing a selfless transcendent progress: founded on reason by which we can reach beyond our animality and historical - cultural situation - which i have been arguing is a conceptually failed project. It was on this sort of sentiment that the dichotomy between the savage and civilized person was founded - Mill, Kant, Bentham, Hegel, Marx among others were all directly involved. And this allowed people like J.S. Mill (of the East Indian Company) to feel very comfortable exploiting the cultural other because what they were really doing was helping, the Indians for example, move upward towards a selfless progress (the notion of 'India' and 'the indians' were their doing). This even involved the English basically creating (or as they saw it discovering, solidifying, making more concrete and rational) what we call Hinduism.
Sure, Russell isn't promoting any of this here. It's not that the view that Russell is representing is founded on imperialism. But that Imperialism was founded on this view. So in some sense we shouldn't ignore imperialism when considering the barbarism-civilization dichotomy.
Zizza wrote: “I think the nihilism here comes from a general and very Modern hostility to the passions (or more strongly, to the nature of the human will). But also, there’s the remaining issue of whether it is at all possible to fully divorce our reason from our emotions/passions as they function in a social setting (ought implies can). I would argue that even in our most ardent attempts to do so our discourses still reflect interests which are not purely rational or concerned solely with facts.”
I’m not entirely in agreement with you. First, who are your Modern(s)? I’m not asking for a definition here, i.e., of what “Modern” (man) is, but, rather, a simple question, what thinkers are Modern for you? Are we talking about the quarelle here? Or are your Modern(s) from some other species? Or, are your Modern(s) those who take Rimbaud’s (violent) guesture: “Il faut absolument etre moderne.”? It seems to be quite apparent that there is a general hostility to the passions today, but that many thinkers of the (past) century, who have forever forced us to re-think how we think, were overwhelmingly, and verifiably, passionate thinkers. (I will continue with this in another, future, post.) I fully agree with the last sentence of this paragraph. Facts teach us nothing of philosophy, but only of the historicity of philosophy. However, I think that there are certain concrete things – they need not be facts, but, simply, what is – that condition the possibilities of philosophy.
Stin wrote: “Is [Russell] just saying that we should try to avoid emotional judgement and bias in our writing if we are trying to convey a journalistic representation of an event or idea?”
I don’t think it’s possible that “journalistic representation of an event or idea” is ever devoid of emotional judgment, or, rather, opinion. But I will admit, that this is also what I took from the excerpt: that emotional evocations need to be done away with at all costs.
“Is he arguing for a distinction or intentional separation between an emotional and value-laden argument, and a dry fact-based assumption?”
I think this question was presupposed, perhaps overhastily, in my response.
Tom wrote: “Russell wrote this essay near the end of World War II and is obviously commenting on political rhetoric emerging around the conflict between the U.S.S.R and the United States. This paragraph concerns the Cold War.”
I was anticipating this, the moment I intentionally altered some terms of one of the examples (U.S.S.R. to Russia, which is, in fact, as far as I know, much smaller in its geographical size). But you, nevertheless, raise an important point. That this statement concerns politics, and not simply rhetoric (and language and logic as well). One could say, that, secretly, abstracted from its context, it is overdetermined by politics.
Tom wrote: “I find it curious how one of the above arguments implicitly labels those exploited in "colonialism" and "imperialism" as "Barbarians," when Russell does no such thing.”
Let me rephrase what I wrote to emphasize that I do no such thing as equate “Barbarians” with “the exploited”. I nowhere mention “the exploited”. I think that the ideals of some sort of transformative process of from “barbarism” to “civilization” – (which certainly extends from the Enlightenment, up to it’s neo-Kantian projects of cosmopolitanism and deliberative democracy, a la Habermas, et al.) and this is what Russell explicitly states – are certainly loaded with ideological content for many colonialists and imperialists, in general, today and in the past, found in a multiplicity of writings (whether they be literary-aesthetic, a la Conrad and so many others, or otherwise).
Excursus on an the first incursion of the prior paragraph: I find the term “deliberative” striking, as if saying not simply to include everyone’s voice in the grand debate, but, rather, more explicitly, to de-liberate, to negate any possibility for new forms of emancipation. As if by attacking the concept of freedom (of speech acts?), or de-liberation, which I don’t think Habermas does, he inherently places a limit on what can and cannot be said (and I think this is also verifiable for many analytic philsophers: i.e., to determine what is sense and what is non-sense, and thus do away with all non-sense, even though what may be non-sensicle today may make perfectly logical sense in the future), and thus turning his whole project of all-inclusive deliberative democracy against itself.
Billy wrote: “I don't think Russell's use of "civilization" and "barbarism" reflect his inability to make "a plea for clear thinking", but more likely our inability to interpret these terms beyond what red flags they raise.”
Agreed. Perhaps we should do away with red flags and opt for the absolute instant replay challenge?
Zizza’s late comments on the “transition from barbarism to civilization” is right on point. Your short comment on Hinduism is also very apt. I spent three years in this field, if one can call it that: colonial/postcolonial studies questioning the way the English helped codify many Hindu laws, primarily with Brahmin influence, to equate them with hierarchical laws and the distribution of castes – based on such terrible moral codes, as purity laws, housing and land distribution, etc. – similar and comparable – but of course no more civilized! – to those of colonial England. Indeed, the very notion of Hinduism is a colonial creation, but the compliance of Brahmins (although not only “Brahmins”, which is, again, like Hinduism, not necessarily a unified category or class), “the priests”, with the English philologists, archeaologists, and cartographers documenting for the Queen these exotic peoples, nonetheless, cannot be ignored, especially with regards to politically charged, highly sectarian, Hindutva groups, which exist to this day – reading Salman Rushdie, although I don’t agree with his political positions after the Ayatollah’s fatwa, particularly Midnight’s Children, Shame, The Satanic Verses, gives us a succinct reading of some of these fantasies at the close of the British rule and in the subsequent years after their exit, in India and Pakistan. But Sir, yes, Sir Rushdie, of course, was only born on that “Midnight” of emancipation from England. In practice, today, of course, there is no such thing as Hinduism as some unified system.
When I was in Nepal, for example, it seemed next to impossible to attempt to logically codify any sort of Hindu distribution of gods, daily ritual practices, etc., without falling into the trap of some sort of absolute relativism – of course, I was not there to do this, although most of the prior “social science” literature (i.e., primarily neo-colonialist writing!), I’d read up to that point had convinced me that it was possible! The problem I think for the English was that it was unable to comprehend the fact that each and every subject has his own multiplicity of deities that he or she confides in (whether they truly believe these things or not). If Hegel was polytheistic, as has been sometimes assumed, I have a feeling even he would’ve trembled at the seemingly infinite multiplicity of the stone, painted, and spectral deities that proliferate in the traditional practices of that region of the world, were he to have actually encountered them in all there real horror and sublimity.
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